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UNDOING UNDUE FAVORS: PROVIDING COMPETITORS
WITH STANDING TO CHALLENGE FAVORABLE
IRS ACTIONS
Sunil Shenoi*
The Internal Revenue Service occasionally creates rules, notices, or regulations
that allow taxpayers to pay less than they would under a strict reading of the law.
Sometimes, however, these IRS actions are directly contrary to federal law and have
significant economic impact. Challenging favorable IRS actions through litigation
will likely be unsuccessful because no plaintiff can satisfy the requirements for
standing. To address this situation, this Note proposes a statutory reform to pro-
vide competitors with standing to challenge favorable IRS actions in court.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most taxpayers dread the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for its
hard-earned reputation of finding ways to take away taxpayers'
hard-earned money. Occasionally, the IRS creates rules, notices, or
regulations that are actually favorable to taxpayers, in terms of al-
lowing them to pay less than might be required under a strict
reading of the law. As welcome a gift as this may be to the taxpayers
that save money under the IRS action, some favorable actions by
the IRS can be just as inappropriate as an IRS action that requires
taxpayers to pay more than the law requires.
The inappropriateness of a favorable IRS action is not based on
how much or how little a taxpayer must pay in taxes. Rather, some
favorable IRS actions are inappropriate because they are directly
contrary to federal law. The IRS may not have legal authority to
take such actions, and such actions can have significant economic
impact. Agency actions that are not authorized by statute or are
contrary to federal law are inconsistent with the role of an adminis-
trative agency, lack accountability, and essentially bypass this
country's system of checks and balances. Despite these grave con-
sequences, little can be done to challenge favorable IRS actions, as
it is unlikely that any party has standing to successfully bring a
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lawsuit against the IRS. Thus, favorable IRS actions are effectively
unreviewable in a court of law.
This Note proposes a statutory reform to allow favorable IRS ac-
tions to be challenged in court. Part II will provide a sampling of
favorable actions by the IRS that negate or override statutes and
judicially-made law. Part II will then focus on IRS Notice 2008-83 as
a recent example of favorable action and will describe the prob-
lems accompanying it, namely, the potentially huge economic
costs, the IRS's lack of authority to issue the notice, and the IRS's
effective waiver of existing federal law. Part III uses Notice 2008-83
to illustrate that currently available political and judicial remedies
inadequately counteract a favorable IRS action's harm. Part IV
proposes a statutory reform that provides judicial standing for
competitors to challenge favorable IRS actions. In addition, Part IV
demonstrates that such a reform would withstand judicial scrutiny.
Finally, Part IV considers a number of policy issues related to the
proposed reform.
1I. FAVORABLE IRS ACTIONS: WHAT ARE THEY
AND WHY ARE THEY BAD?
As part of the IRS's responsibility for administering and enforc-
ing tax laws, the IRS provides interpretations of tax law to facilitate
understanding and compliance by taxpayers. On some issues where
the law is unclear, the IRS occasionally takes a position that is fa-
vorable to taxpayers, in the sense that taxpayers pay less in taxes
under the position chosen by the IRS than they would under an
alternative position the IRS could have taken. This Note focuses on
IRS actions that are favorable to taxpayers but also directly contrary
to federal law, whether such law is congressionally or judicially cre-
ated. Such actions are problematic because the IRS may not have
legal authority to take the favorable action and such action can
have a significant economic impact. Favorable IRS actions with
these characteristics also have serious policy implications, in that
they are inconsistent with the role of an administrative agency, lack
accountability, and essentially bypass this country's system of
checks and balances.
Surprisingly, the IRS has a history of acting in taxpayers' favor
and diverging from federal law. For example, the IRS contravened
the Supreme Court regarding whether a company can deduct fees
paid to investment banks to facilitate a merger. In INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, the Court held that such fees could not be deducted;
instead, the fees had to be capitalized because they would yield
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benefits beyond the current tax year.' The IRS later backed away
from the Court's "future benefit" test2 by establishing regulations
that were more favorable to taxpayers than the Court's decision.
The regulations permitted deductions for investment banking ex-
penses, resulting in immediate tax savings, whereas the Court's
decision would have caused taxpayers to realize benefits over a pe-
riod of years.
The Court and the IRS have also differed over whether stock
used in hedging transactions qualifies as a capital or an ordinary
asset. This categorization is important because it affects the tax rate
on gains from the sale of those assets. In Arkansas Best Corp. v.
Commissioner, the Court held that the business motivation for ac-
quiring and selling stock is irrelevant to determining whether stock
is a capital asset.4 The Court stated, however, that business motiva-
tion is relevant for determining the applicability of statutory
exclusions from capital assets, such as whether the stock qualified
as inventory. The Court's decision suggested that sales of shares in
hedging transactions were capital assets. The IRS responded by
issuing regulations providing a number of hedging transactions
with ordinary income treatment,6 in apparent conflict with the
Court's decision in Arkansas Best. The IRS regulations were more
favorable to the taxpayer because ordinary income tax rates are
higher than capital income tax rates, and thus losses on ordinary
assets save more in taxes than losses on capital assets.
While these examples provide a small sampling of favorable ac-
tions by the IRS that are contrary to Supreme Court decisions, the
IRS's favorable actions can also conflict with federal statutes. This
Note will focus on Notice 2008-83, one of the IRS's actions that has
conflicted with a federal statute, to better illustrate the conse-
quences of favorable IRS action.
1. 503 U.S. 79,90 (1992).
2. See T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B. 448. The IRS's reversal is odd because the Court's opin-
ion supported the position taken by the IRS during the litigation of that case. INDOPCO, 503
U.S. at 84.
3. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 501 (14th ed. 2006) ("The
rules found in the regulations are in some respects more favorable to taxpayers than the
more stringent rules that might have been imposed under existing precedent.").
4. 485 U.S. 212, 217 (1988) ("The broad definition of the term 'capital asset' explic-
idy makes irrelevant any consideration of the property's connection with the taxpayer's
business ... ").
5. Id. at 221.
6. KLEIN ET AL., suprta note 3, at 694.
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A. Overview of IRS Notice 2008-83
In mid-September 2008, the sudden demise of two of the largest
financial institutions in the world, Lehman Brothers and Merrill
Lynch, rocked the global economy.7 As the financial world focused
on the U.S. government's proposed $700 billion bailout of the
banking industry, the IRS and the United States Department of the
Treasury Department (the Treasury) undertook a number of steps
to provide their own form of relief for troubled financial institu-
tions." One of these steps occurred on September 30, 2008, when
the IRS issued Notice 2008-83. 9 Within a few weeks, the controversy
surrounding Notice 2008-83's questionable authority and poten-
tially massive tax implications elevated it to the front pages of some
of the largest newspapers in the country.0
To understand the controversy surrounding Notice 2008-83, it is
necessary to understand some basic principles of corporate tax law.
As a taxable entity, a corporation has a number of tax attributes,
such as earnings and profits, tax credits, or a net operating loss." A
tax attribute may be considered favorable if it has a positive effect
on the corporation, such as saving taxes or increasing revenue.
When a corporation undertakes certain types of transactions, such
as a merger, it may lose some of the tax attributes, favorable or
otherwise, that it possessed prior to that transaction. 2 For situa-
tions where a tax attribute would survive a transaction, Congress
has enacted special rules to "prevent trafficking in favorable tax
attributes.'
13
Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code is one such rule that
limits the use of a favorable tax attribute. Section 382 applies when
7. Gary Duncan, Lehman Collapse Sends Shockwave Round World, TIMES (London), Sept.
16, 2008, at 1; Lehman Brothers Collapse Stuns Global Markets, CNN.coM, Sept. 15, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/15/lehman.merrill.stocks.turmoil/index.html
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
8. Jesse Drucker, Obscure Tax Breaks Increase Cost of Financial Rescue, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 2008, at A3.
9. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 200842 I.R.B. 905.
10. See Drucker, supra note 8, at A3; Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for US. Banks,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2008, at Al; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bank Deals Get Help from the LR.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nyumes.com/2008/10/07/bank-deals-get-
help-from-the-irs/ (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
11. DouGLAs A. KAHN & JEFFREY S. LEHMAN, CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION 967 (5th
ed. 2001).
12. Id. ("[I]t is important to know whether that tax attribute survives: (1) a significant
change in the ownership of the corporation's stock, (2) a significant change in the corpora-
tion's structure, (3) an absorption of the corporation's assets into a different corporation,
(4) an amalgamation with one or more other corporations, or (5) a termination of the
business previously conducted by the corporation.").
13. Id. at 969.
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two requirements have been met. First, § 382 applies only to loss
corporations,'4 which are those corporations that have a net operat-
ing loss or a net unrealized built-in loss. 15 A net operating loss
means the amount by which a corporation's tax deductions are
greater than its gross income.' 6 A net unrealized built-in loss occurs
with respect to an asset that the corporation owns when that asset's
fair market value is less than its cost.7 For example, a mortgage
owned by a bank would have a $400,000 net unrealized built-in loss
if the bank purchased it for $1 million at the peak of the housing
boom, but the value of the mortgage later fell to $600,000 after the
credit crisis started and the bank realized the lender was less likely
to pay back the loan.'
8
The second § 382 requirement is that the loss corporation must
undergo an "ownership change." 9 An ownership change occurs
when a shareholder that owns five percent or more of the corpora-
tion's stock, as of a given date, increases his ownership by more
20than fifty percent over a given period. Ownership changes may
21occur in the context of reorganizations, such as mergers.
To illustrate the operation of § 382, consider the following hypo-
thetical. If X Corporation has net unrealized built-in losses of $100
million, and then Y Corporation acquires X Corporation, Y Corpo-
ration may be able to deduct X Corporation's $100 million in net
unrealized built-in losses, which means that Y Corporation pays less
in corporate taxes than it otherwise would.22 Y Corporation's ability
14. See I.R.C. § 382 (2006); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(a) (1) (2007); KAHN & LEH-
MAN, supra note 11, at 1002.
15. § 382(k) (1).
16. I.R.C. § 172(c) (2006).
17. See § 382(h)(3) (A)(i). In arriving at this definition, I have used two simplifying as-
sumptions. The first assumption is that the asset's cost is a sufficient substitute for its
.aggregate adjusted basis." Id. Second, I will ignore the threshold requirement for net unre-
alized built-in losses described in § 382(h) (3) (B).
18. In the fourth quarter of 2007 alone, Wells Fargo was forced to recognize $1.4 bil-
lion in losses from mortgage related loans. Jonathan Stempel, UPDATE 2-Wells Fargo to Take
$1.4 bin Charge for Bad Loans, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/
fundsFundsNews/idUSN2754071620071127?sp=true (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
19. I.R.C. § 382(g); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(a)(1) (2007); KAHN & LEHMAN, su-
pra note 11, at 1002.
20. I.R.C. § 382(g); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(a) (1). The above definition of own-
ership change leaves out the concept of testing date, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(a) (2) (i),
and testing period, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(d), because they are not critical for the
reader to understand the impact of Notice 2008-83.
21. KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 11, at 1017 ("Section 382 limitations can apply to re-
organizations if there is an ownership change.").
22. The aggregate deduction may not be exactly equal to the amount of net operating
losses or net unrealized built-in losses held by the acquired company prior to its acquisition.
Id. at 1001 (Section 382 "permit[s] a deduction for such losses to approximately the same
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to reduce its tax liability by acquiring X Corporation's losses makes
those losses quite valuable. Section 382 limits "trafficking in tax
attributes" 23 by limiting the amount of X Corporation's losses that Y
Corporation can deduct to offset its own gross income in any year
after its acquisition of X Corporation. 24 Thus, instead of Y Corpora-
tion deducting $100 million in losses acquired from Corporation X
in the year after the acquisition, Y Corporation might have to wait a
number of years to deduct the entire amount of the acquired
losses.2'
Notice 2008-83, in only a couple of sentences, completely
changed the operation of § 382 in the context of bank acquisitions
of other corporations. 6 Continuing with the hypothetical transac-
tion between X Corporation and Y Corporation, Notice 2008-83
would treat the net unrealized built-in losses acquired from X Cor-
poration as if they were not attributable to X before the
acquisition-in effect, the losses would be treated as originating in
Y Corporation. 27 As a result, § 382's limitation on the amount of the
losses that Y Corporation can deduct each year after the acquisition
would not apply, and Y Corporation could deduct the entire
amount of the net unrealized built-in losses in the tax year imme-
diately after the acquisition.
Notice 2008-83's change to § 382's application was not merely
theoretical; it had significant practical consequences as well. At the
time of Wells Fargo's 2008 acquisition of Wachovia, Wachovia had
$74 billion in mortgage-related losses. s Consequently, Notice 2008-
83 permitted Wells Fargo to immediately deduct the entire $74
billion in mortgage losses acquired from Wachovia. In contrast,
extent as would have been allowed if there had been no change of ownership and if instead
the assets of the loss corporation had been contributed to a partnership that produced the
annual income that was subsequently earned by the surviving corporation. The operation of
the provision only approximates an equivalent consequence, but a rough equivalence is the
aim of the statute."). However, this distinction is not relevant for the purpose of explaining
the impact of Notice 2008-83.
23. See supra text accompanying note 13.
24. KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 11, at 1000 (Section 382 "limits the amount of such
carryover loss that can be deducted [by the acquiring corporation] in a taxable year after
the change of ownership takes place.").
25. Id. ("In many circumstances, the application of § 382 will not prevent the deduc-
tion of the entire amount of a net operating loss, but rather will affect the timing of the
deduction by spreading it over a number of years."). Of course, the number of years it would
take for the acquiring corporation to use the loss will be influenced by § 382's limitation on
the amount of loss. See supra text accompanying note 22.
26. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905.
27. Id. ("[A]ny deduction properly allowed after an ownership change ... to a bank
with respect to losses on loans... shall not be treated as a built-in loss or a deduction that is
attributable to periods before the change date.").
28. See Drucker, supra note 8, at A3.
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had § 382 been applied as Congress intended, the provision could
have required Wachovia to spread the deductions from those
mortgage losses over twenty years.29
B. Economic Impact
Notice 2008-83 provided significant economic benefits to banks
because it allowed banks to offset their income with losses acquired
from another corporation, which meant they paid less in taxes on
that income. An equally important consequence was that every dol-
lar of corporate tax saved by a bank as a result of Notice 2008-83
was a dollar that the federal government failed to collect in that
year. Thus although Congress battled over the decision to spend
$700 billion to bail out troubled banks,0 the true bailout cost was
$700 billion plus corporate taxes lost by Notice 2008-83.
The question, then, is how much did Notice 2008-83 save banks
and cost the federal government? The answer depends on deter-
mining the fair market value of a bank's assets, which is normally a
complicated task. 1 Since Notice 2008-83 greatly benefitted banks
with mortgage losses, valuation of such losses is even more difficult
due to the "currently contracted market for loans.'32 A number of
sources cite as authoritative a report that estimated the net tax
savings to banks as $140 billion. The authors of the $140 billion
estimate subsequently issued another report that qualified their
$140 billion estimate as a maximum that relied on a number of
29. Id.
30. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 110-343, § 115(a)(3), 122 Stat.
3765, 3780 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5225). Of course, other bailout legislation
may increase the cost well beyond $700 billion.
31. See generally FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 157: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS (2006) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas157.pdf (providing a 145 page framework for measuring fair market value).
32. RSM MCGLADREY, INC., RECENT GUIDANCE PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS IN
BANK ACQUISITIONS 1 (2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form), available at http://www2.rsmmcgladrey.com/pdf/section 382_bank..alert.pdf; see also
SEC Press Release No. 2008-234, SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB Staff Clarifi-
cations on Fair Value Accounting (Sept. 30, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-234.htm
(providing additional guidance on fair value measurements because "[tihe current envi-
ronment has made questions surrounding the determination of fair value particularly
challenging for preparers, auditors, and users of financial information.").
33. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Federal Bills Would Rescind IRS Notice Lifting Restrictions on
Banks Use of Net Operating Losses Following Acquisition, TAX MGM'T WKLY. ST. TAX REP.: REVE-
NUE, Nov. 28, 2008, at 2 (citing Carl M. Jenks et al., Major Tax Incentive For Bank Purchases:
IRS Eliminates the Limitation on Banks' Built-In Losses Post-Purchase, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY
197-227 (Oct. 8, 2008)).
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"very big" assumptions. 4 This report cautioned that the best way to
determine the tax savings to banks is to review the actual amount
of built-in gains and losses in the SEC filings for a bank acquisition,
such as the two bank deals that occurred soon after Notice 2008-83
was issued. 5 Presumably having performed this task, or relying on
"those with actual knowledge of the real figures," the authors con-
cluded that the tax "benefit [to banks] was not a significant tax
subsidy.,16 However, the report did not reveal a revised estimate of
the actual monetary tax benefits to banks.37
Nevertheless, other reports38 make clear that Notice 2008-83
provided extraordinary tax savings to banks and an equal amount
of lost revenue for the federal government. Notice 2008-83 likely
allowed Wells Fargo to save approximately $19.4 billion in taxes
through its acquisition of Wachovia, specifically, its $74 billion in
losses from mortgage-related securities and loans. 9 Moreover, Wells
Fargo only paid approximately $14.3 billion for Wachovia, so the
tax savings paid for the acquisition. ° Similarly, PNC Financial Ser-
vices Group likely enjoyed tax savings with a present value equal to
the entire $5.2 billion it spent to acquire National City Corpora-
34. CARL M. JENKS ET AL., REVISITING NOTICE 2008-83 2 (2008) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/
pubs-detail.aspx?publD=S5711. Their "very big" assumptions arise from the fact that the
$140 billion estimate was:
[E]xtrapolated from IMF estimates of $1 trillion of mortgage-related losses in the bank-
ing system, of which approximately $400 billion had not yet been taken into account. If
those numbers were correct, if every bank with unrecognized losses had a change of
ownership, if under applicable law all of those losses were in fact 'net built-in losses,' if
there were no offsetting 'built-in gains,' and if the applicable 382 limitation would pre-
vent, not just defer, the deduction of all such losses, then the total tax 'cost' of
deducting those $400 billion of losses would be approximately $140 billion.
Id. Despite these assumptions, the tax savings to banks could be significantly higher than
$140 billion because IMF estimates of the mortgage-related losses in the US banking system
have spiraled upwards from $1 trillion to $2.7 trillion. See Peter Dattels & Laura Kodres,
Further Action Needed to Reinforce Signs of Market Recovery: IMF, IMF SURV. MAG., Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/RES042109C.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
35. JENKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 3. The author reviewed Wells Fargo's SEC filings but
did not find any listing of the amount of built-in gains and losses.
36. Id.
37. The report did note one non-monetary benefit of Notice 2008-83, which is that it
provided clarity "to the tax calculations of the combined banks going forward." Id.
38. The accuracy of the data upon which some reports rely to estimate Notice 2008-
83's impact is not clear because they do not mention the source of the data, such as SEC
filings or inside sources with knowledge of the actual financial figures. See Drucker, supra
note 8, at A3. In addition, this Note assumes that, if not specified, these estimates of tax
savings are not discounted to their net present value and therefore could be slightly inflated.
39. Drucker, supra note 8, at A3.
40. Id.
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tion.4 Wells Fargo and PNC may not be able to utilize the full value
of their acquired losses for quite some time because "[tlax losses
only work when you have a lot of income, and right now the
[banks] don't have a lot of income."42 Nevertheless, Notice 2008-83
likely cost the federal government over $20 billion in future corpo-
rate tax revenue from only two bank acquisitions, such that even if
the estimates are discounted to net present value, the federal gov-
ernment has still lost a tremendous amount of money.
Aside from the impact on the federal government, Notice 2008-83
also had financial implications for state government tax revenues.
This secondary impact occurred because "states with corporate in-
come taxes almost universally base their corporate taxes on federal
rules."43 Thus, if Notice 2008-83 reduced a bank's federal tax liability,
that bank could also have reduced state tax liability in any state in
which that bank operates. California, for example, could have lost
nearly $2 billion over the next ten years due to Notice 2008-83.'" No-
tice 2008-83's impact on states is not unique to California-the
financial services industry provides a substantial portion of the gross
domestic product for Delaware (32.5%), New York (18%), Con-
necticut (16.5%), and Rhode Island (12.1%).
45
States are free to decouple their tax laws from federal tax laws,
so that a change at the federal level will not automatically apply to
them, and California has attempted to do just that.46 However, the
regulatory process can take nine to twelve months to complete.4 7 In
41. Matthew Scott, How IRS Breaks Could Boost Bank Bailout Tab, FIN. WK., Nov. 2, 2008,
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/arficle?AID=/20081102/REG/311039969
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
42. Id. However, this argument may be weak due to some banks' increased profits after
Notice 2008-83. See ArM Levy, Wells Fargo Profit Climbs 53 Percent on Mortgages, BLOOMBERG, Apr.
22, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid=a6Ymum7TcA3Q (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
43. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, NEW IRS RULING ON BANK ACQUISITIONS IMPOSES MA-
JOR FEDERAL CORPORATE TAX CuTs-AND WILL HURT STATES Too 2 (2008) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/
irsruling20081106.pdf.
44. Evan Halper, Banks' Tax Breaks Could Cost the State $2 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2008, at Al.
45. Bennett, supra note 33, at 2.
46. See CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED WITH FORMAL
REGULATION PROCESS ON THE ADOPTION OF CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 18,
SECTION 24451, RELATING TO CALIFORNIA NON-CONFORMITY WITH IRS NOTICE 2008-83
(proposed Mar. 19, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/meetings/attachments/031909/5a.pdf.
47. MICHAEL J. CATALDO, FTB INTENDS TO DEPART FROM IRS TREATMENT OF BAD
LOAN LOSSES FOR ACQUIRED BANKS 2 (2008) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal
of Law Reform), available at http://www.pillsburylaw.com/content/portal/publications/
2008/12/2008121617102796/Tax%20State%20&%2Local%2Tax%20Vol%201900%2No
%201923%2012-16-08.pdf.
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the meantime, states lose significant tax revenues-in 2008 alone,
California could have lost approximately $300 million in corporate
tax revenue due to Notice 2008-83. 4s This is not to say that the
Treasury should consult with state governments before making
changes.49 Nevertheless, implementing a rule change with such
sweeping economic magnitude through the legislative process in-
stead of an IRS notice would have provided state governments with
notice and time to decouple their own laws before losing corporate
tax revenue.
Beyond tax savings and lost tax revenue, Notice 2008-83 affected
the economy by providing "an artificial competitive advantage to
banks that can afford to expand now by effectively offering a tax
break for acquiring other banks.' '0 The Notice had an immediate
impact on the competitive landscape of the financial industry. For
example, Wachovia had agreed to be purchased by Citigroup on
September 29, 2008, the IRS issued Notice 2008-83 on September
30, and then Wells Fargo-which had earlier tried to acquire Wa-
chovia-made a larger and ultimately successful bid to acquire
Wachovia.51 The Treasury's foray into economic policy may have
been further misguided because Notice 2008-83 "could have [had]
the unintended consequence of motivating more financial firms
wanting future tax deductions to shelter their earnings to buy
competitors, leading to more consolidation in the financial indus-
try than would be necessary to restore stability in the financial
sector.
5 2
Notice 2008-83 had a significant impact on the tax revenues of
the federal government, as well as many state governments. Lower
tax revenues may mean that federal and state governments will be
forced to impose a higher tax on their citizens to make up the lost
revenues. Alternatively, federal and state governments may be
forced to cut programs and services, which could disproportion-
ately impact needy populations. In addition, Notice 2008-83
altered the financial industry's competitive landscape by facilitating
transactions that were unlikely to happen on their own, and by
48. Halper, supra note 44, at Al.
49. The Treasury Department admitted it did not consider Notice 2008-83's impact on
state governments, even though it had been working on Notice 2008-83's rule changes for
weeks. Id.
50. CITIZENS FOR TAXJUSTICE, supra note 43, at 1.
51. Paley, supra note 10.
52. Jonathan Stempel, Schumer Questions IRS Rule Aiding Wells-Wachovia, REuTERS, Oct.
30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN3029875020081030 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). It is not clear how many transac-
tions were motivated by Notice 2008-83, due to its short life span. See infra Part III.A
(discussing Notice 2008-83's repeal).
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causing transactions to happen in a way they otherwise would not
have. Considering these severe consequences, "favorable" IRS ac-
tions may not be as welcome or appropriate as originally
imagined.5
C. Policy Implications
The impact of favorable IRS actions goes far beyond the eco-
nomic realm. Favorable IRS actions may be contrary to Congress's
clear statement on a subject and such action may be taken without
legal authority. Actions with these characteristics, if unchecked, are
troublesome because they imply that agencies-whose members
are not elected by the public-can act outside their role and super-
sede Congress, without accountability through the political
process.
1. IRS Supersedes Congress on Substantive Policy
Notice 2008-83 modified § 382's operation in two ways that were
inconsistent with the plain meaning of § 382's text. The first modi-
fication to § 382 dealt with the types of losses that are subject to
§ 382's limitation. The statute unambiguously states that in the
years after a corporation undergoes an ownership change, the
post-change corporation is limited in how much it can offset its
taxable income with "pre-change losses.0 4 Pre-change losses are
losses incurred by the corporation prior to the ownership change,
and include both net operating losses" and net unrealized built-in
losses.5' In addition, pre-change losses must have been incurred in
the same taxable year as the ownership change 7 and must be "al-
locable to the period ... before the" date of ownership change .5
Notice 2008-83 exempted net unrealized built-in losses from § 382's
coverage by stating that they were not allocable to the period
53. IRS action that provides favorable treatment to certain taxpayers may also be inap-
propriate when Treasury and IRS have potential conflicts of interest with those taxpayers. See
Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Seeks Inspector General Review of Treas-
ury Bank Merger Move (Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prgl11408c.pdf. How-
ever, the role of conflicts of interest is beyond the scope of this Note.
54. I.R.C. § 382(a) (2006). The amount of the limitation is defined in § 382(b).
55. § 382(d) (1).
56. § 382(h) (1) (B).
57. § 382(d)(1)(A) ("[T]he taxable year ending with the ownership change or [the
year] in which the change date occur[ed].").
58. § 382(d) (1)(B) (emphasis added).
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before the date of ownership change. 59 Thus, Notice 2008-83 was
plainly inconsistent with § 382.
Notice 2008-83 then went a step further and allowed only
banks to claim the exemption on net unrealized built-in losses.6°
This extremely favorable treatment" for banks has no textual ba-
sis in the statute because § 382 states that it applies to "any new loss
corporation,"62 which "includes any corporation with a net unreal-
ized built-in loss. ",63 Thus, Notice 2008-83 was inconsistent with
§ 382's text.
The Treasury also disregarded Congress's policy for implement-
ing § 382. Under § 382(k), the Treasury can use regulations to
redefine which corporations, including those with net unrealized
built-in losses, qualify as a loss corporation.6 However, the Treasury
and the IRS did not implement a new definition of loss corpora-
tion through regulations.65 By using a notice instead, the IRS
contravened Congress's specified mechanism for implementing
statutory policy.
Beyond outright inconsistencies, Notice 2008-83 also departed
from the history and legislative intent of § 382. Prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, § 382 eliminated "all or a portion of a corpo-
ration's net operating loss carryover" when an ownership change
occurred.6 The 1986 amendments to § 382 adopted the current
approach, which permits only a fraction of the net operating loss
carryover to be deducted each year after the ownership change.67
Consequently, the IRS should not have used Notice 2008-83 to
override a carefully considered legislative scheme that has been in
existence for over twenty years.68
59. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905 ("For purposes of section 382(h), any de-
duction properly allowed after an ownership change ... shall not be treated as a built-in loss
or a deduction that is attributable to periods before the change date.").
60. Id. Notice 2008-83 refers to banks as they are defined under § 581. Id.
61. See supra Part II.B.
62. I.R.C. § 382(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
63. § 382(k) (1) (emphasis added).
64. Id. ("Except to the extent provided in the regulations, such term includes any cor-
poration with a net unrealized built-in loss.").
65. Compare § 382(k)(1) (defining loss corporation), § 382(k)(2) (defining old loss
corporation), and § 382(k)(3) (defining new loss corporation), with Treas. Reg. § 1.382-
2(a) (1) (2008) (defining loss corporation), Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(f) (2) (2007) (de-
fining old loss corporation), and Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(f)(3) (defining new loss
corporation).
66. KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 11, at 1000.
67. See§ 382(a), (b).
68. Geithner Promises Congress to Review IRS Ruling 2008-83, FIN. CRISIS NEWS CTR., Jan.
27, 2009 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/01/geithner-promises-congress-to-review-irs-
ruling-200883.html ("Senator Grassley noted that Section 382 was not enacted lightly by
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2. IRS Acts Without Legal Authority
Notice 2008-83's end-run around the established legislative
scheme of § 382 raises the question of whether the IRS or the
Treasury Department had the legal authority to issue the notice.
Media coverage of Notice 2008-83 included discussion of this issue
but statements that the Treasury lacked legal authority to issue No-
tice 2008-83 were conclusory and lacked legal analysis or
explanation. 69
Various parties have put forth justifications for Notice 2008-83's
legal authority. The most common of these relies on § 382(m),
which expressly permits the Treasury Secretary to "prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this section."70 However, Notice 2008-83's exclusion of
net unrealized built-in losses from the definition of pre-change
losses, resulting in unfettered deductions of net unrealized built-in
losses, did not seem to "carry out the purposes"" of § 382, when
the purpose was to "limit[] the extent to which ... built-in losses
... can be utilized., 71 Indeed, the Joint Committee on Taxation
found that "Notice 2008-83 [was] inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent in enacting ... section 382(m)" and that "the legal
authority to prescribe Notice 2008-83 [was] doubtful."
73
Moreover, "there is no ambiguity in the language of 382 that the
Notice [was] intended to cure."74 Of course, § 382(m) lists only five
Congress, but rather after extensive scholarly reflection by the staffs of the Senate and
House tax-writing committees and the Joint Committee on Taxation. It has been an estab-
lished part of the law ever since 1986.").
69. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 8, at A3 (Robert Willens, an independent corporate
tax analyst, said, "It doesn't seem possible that they have this authority."); Paley, supra note
10, at A6 ("More than a dozen tax lawyers interviewed for this story--including several rep-
resenting banks that stand to reap billions from the change-said the Treasury had no
authority to issue the notice."); id. at Al (George K. Yin, the former chief of staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, stated, "Did the Treasury Department have the authority to do
this? I think almost every tax expert would agree that the answer is no.").
70. I.R.C. § 382(m) (2006). In fact, the Treasury Department itself, along with tax law-
yers that represent banks, has turned to § 382(m) as a justification of its authority to issue
Notice 2008-83. Paley, supra note 10, at A6 (Andrew C. DeSouza, a Treasury spokesperson,
and others have said "the legal authority came from Section 382 itself, which says the secre-
tary can write regulations to 'carry out the purposes of this section.'").
71. § 382(m).
72. KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 11, at 1001.
73. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S MODIFICATION TO
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT TAX ACT OF
2009" 12 (2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-1 2-09.pdf.
74. Victor Fleischer, NOLs and the Rule of Law, TAXPROF BLOG, Nov. 23, 2008,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprofblog/2008/11/nols-and-the-rule-of-law.html (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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types of allowable regulations, and Congress's use of the phrase
"including (but not limited to)" when describing five types of al-
lowable regulations indicates that Congress expected the Treasury
to create other types of regulations.75 However, § 382(m) does not
seem to authorize Notice 2008-83 because § 382(m) "does not au-
thorize the Secretary to provide exemptions or special rules that
are restricted to particular industries or classes of taxpayers., 76 In
addition, the IRS did not create regulations through a notice and
comment process, which might permit an administrative agency to
issue policy with broader scope that it otherwise might have.77
An alternative justification for 2008-83's legal authority comes
from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 8 Under TARP,
"Treasury [has] broad authority to purchase assets and securities."7"
However, "[TARP] does not grant authority to re-write tax legisla-
tion in whatever manner promotes bank mergers.... If Congress
wanted to give Treasury the authority to fiddle with 382, it clearly
could have done so."' Congress could have also chosen to allow
the Treasury to waive sections of the Internal Revenue Code, but it
chose not to. The argument that Congress could or should have
been more specific is a standard response to any question of legis-
lative interpretation. In this case, however, it is especially relevant
considering Congress gave Treasury only very specific, narrow au-
thority to create regulations regarding gains or losses of preferred
stock in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.8' Thus, TARP is unlikely to
provide Treasury with valid authority to issue Notice 2008-83.
Another theory authorizing Notice 2008-83 relies on Notice
2003-65. The theory is that Notice 2008-83 was a "continuation of
the regulatory authority exercised in Notice 2003-65," s  in which
the Treasury and the IRS provided initial guidance on the identifi-
cation of built-in gains and losses under § 382(h). 3 The problem
75. § 382(m). The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of five types of potential regu-
lations in § 382(m)(1)-(5).
76. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 73, at 12; see also Fleischer, supra note 74
(stating that it is unlikely that "Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the Treasury to
make [a] new exception to the statutory language").
77. Fleischer, supra note 74 ("Administrative law principles do provide somewhat
broader latitude for regulations that go through the notice and comment procedure, but
that hasn't happened here.").
78. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-5241).
79. Fleischer, supra note 74.
80. Id.
81. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 301 (a)-(b),
122 Stat. 3765, 3802 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5261).
82. JENKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
83. I.R.S. Notice 2003-65, 2003-40 I.R.B. 747.
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with this theory is that the Treasury's legal authority to issue Notice
2008-83 would depend upon another notice it issued; the Treasury,
however, cannot set the bounds of its own authority. Moreover, just
because Treasury issued Notice 2003-65 does not mean it had legal
authority to issue Notice 2008-83. Notice 2003-65's validity likely
stems from the fact that it provided guidance on the meaning of a
key term in 382(h), in contrast to Notice 2008-83, which waives ap-
plication of 382(h) (1) (B) altogether. Consequently, Notice 2003-65
does not appear to authorize Notice 2008-83's sweeping changes to
§ 382.
Notice 2008-83 might also be justified based on absolute need.
In this case, the need arises from "illiquidity in the financial mar-
kets,"8 4 difficulty in valuing financial assets,8' and a generally dire
economic climate. A regulatory agency's powers are limited, how-
86ever, to those delegated from Congress in an authorizing statute,
and dire conditions do not legally justify the agency's reach for
powers beyond those provided in the authorizing statute.
Ultimately, the IRS's legal authority to issue Notice 2008-83 likely
did not exist. Although no judicial opinion was issued to support
this conclusion, recent federal legislation confirmed that "[t]he
legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-
83 [was] doubtful."8' Nevertheless, Notice 2008-83 demonstrates
that a favorable IRS action can supersede a Congressional statute,
and that such an action can be taken without legal authority, Allow-
ing an administrative agency to act in such a way is dangerous
because the agency lacks direct political accountability. Combined
with the significant economic consequences to federal and state
governments, as well as to private industry, it is clear that permit-
ting favorable IRS action is not desirable and that such action must
be challenged.
III. CURRENT REMEDIES ARE INSUFFICIENT
To challenge favorable IRS actions, opponents can appeal to
Congress to overturn the action via statute, petition the IRS to
84. JENKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
85. Id.
86. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) ("'When Congress passes
an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of
those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted.'" (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944))).
87. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1261 (a) (3), 123 Stat. 115, 343 (2009).
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revoke its action, avail themselves of the tax whistleblowing statute,
or challenge the IRS action directly through a lawsuit. Each of
these methods has drawbacks, and, using Notice 2008-83 as an ex-
ample, this Part will demonstrate that such methods are unlikely to
reverse the damage done by favorable action.
A. Legislative and Executive Remedies
One way to overturn an agency action is for Congress to pass a
statute. Recourse through legislation is a significant impediment
because of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient political support for
a legislative proposal. Favorable IRS actions may be even more dif-
ficult to overturn via statute because favorable actions tend to
mean fewer taxes, which is usually a popular position across the
political spectrum.8 In the case of Notice 2008-83, overturning an
action meant to help the economy may have been politically im-
possible because it could have been seen as unpatriotic or could
have invited blame for ushering in another Great Depression. 9
Even if Congress is successful in overturning an IRS action, consid-
erable time may pass before the legislative repeal occurs or takes
effect.
Notice 2008-83 was a rare instance of a favorable IRS action that
proved so unpopular, Congress repealed it only four and a half
months after the IRS issued it.9" Still, Notice 2008-83's repeal oc-
curred in the midst of a number of unique circumstances. First, in
the November 2008 elections the Democrats gained control of the
Presidency and strengthened their control over Congress. 9' In ad-
dition, America was in the midst of a severe economic crisis,92 the
financial industry received a large portion of the blame for the
economic cisis,9' and corporations that received seemingly unwar-
ranted benefits during the economic crisis faced significant
88. See Lawrence Zelenak, Can Obama 's IRS Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?,
122 TAX NOTES 889, 890 (2009) (noting that efforts to overturn Notice 2008-83 are unlikely
to succeed because taxpayers lack incentive).
89. Paley, supra note 10, at A6.
90. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1261 (b), 123 Stat. at 343.
91. See, e.g., Julie Strack, Democrats Control Congress, Gain 23 Seats, DAILY CALIFORNIAN,
Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.dailycal.org/article/103423/democrats-control-congress-gain_
23_seats (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
92. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since "30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al.
93. See, e.g., PAUL MuoLo & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: How WALL STREET
CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS (2008).
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backlash. 4 While these factors aligned to favor repeal of an action
benefitting an unpopular group, such alignment is infrequent and
legislative repeal is typically more difficult to obtain.
Even though Congress did repeal Notice 2008-83, the repeal was
prospective.5 Consequently, Congress's action did not fully coun-
teract Notice 2008-83's effects, such as the huge tax breaks enjoyed
by Wells Fargo and PNC in their acquisitions of Wachovia and Na-
tional City Corporation, respectively.96 Understandably, Congress
was concerned that retroactive repeal might create a chilling effect
on compliance with future IRS actions.97 Retroactive repeal could
also exacerbate the financial crisis that Notice 2008-83 sought to
ameliorate, as the banks that acquired distressed banks due to their
increased value under Notice 2008-83 would instead be saddled
with those distressed banks' enormous losses. Nevertheless, pro-
spective repeal is problematic because for the four and a half
months it took for Congress to pass the necessary legislation, the
IRS blatantly operated beyond its authority, waived a clear provi-
sion of a federal statute, and caused significant economic impact.
Thus, even if a prospective legislative repeal occurs, it may be use-
ful to have a way to prevent or rectify the harm that occurred prior
to such repeal.
Another method of seeking repeal of a favorable IRS action is to
petition the IRS to revoke it. In most cases, however, the IRS has
little incentive to reverse course on a notice,98 especially in the ab-
sence of judicial or statutory opposition to the IRS position.
Additionally, the issues that arise when petitioning the IRS to take
action are similar to those when lobbying Congress to take action:
persuading the IRS to issue new guidance is difficult, considerable
time may pass before such guidance is obtained, and the IRS may
hesitate to issue retroactive repeal due to concerns about a chilling
effect on compliance with future guidance and rulings. Further-
more, in contrast to the legislative repeal context, even if the IRS
94. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Bil-
lion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at Al ("The payment of so much money at a
company at the heart of the financial collapse that sent the broader economy into a tailspin
almost certainly will fuel a popular backlash against the government's efforts to prop up
Wall Street."); David R. Francis, Should CEO Pay Restrictions Spread to All Corporations?, CHmis-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0309/p14s0l-
wmgn.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("The financial
crisis has generated a huge amount of anger around the nation at the mismanagement and
excesses of some big bankers.. ").
95. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1261 (b) (1), 123 Stat. 115, 343 (2009).
96. See supra Part II.B.
97. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1261 (a) (4), 123 Star. at 343.
98. Zelenak, supra note 88, at 890.
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were to find a retroactive repeal palatable, the agency's legal au-
thority to issue a retroactive repeal of a notice is unclear.99 Thus,
seeking recourse from the IRS is likely to be unsuccessful.
It is possible that an existing provision of the Internal Revenue
Code could be used to address the problem of lost tax revenue
from favorable IRS treatment. The Secretary of the Treasury has
the power to initiate administrative or judicial action against indi-
viduals who underpaid their taxes or violated the internal revenue
laws.00 In 2006, Congress aided the Secretary's efforts by creating a
tax whistleblowing program, which enables individuals to provide
the Secretary with information about parties that violate tax laws.10 '
Individuals can provide public or non-public information and the
Treasury can reward them accordingly for their help. 0 2 This infor-
mation can then be used by the Treasury and the IRS to initiate a
suit against the party that saved taxes as a result of the IRS's favor-
able action. Such a suit is desirable because to determine whether
that party's reduced tax liability was actually an underpayment in
violation of tax laws, a court would have to evaluate the legitimacy
of the IRS's favorable action in the first place. Yet for that very rea-
son, the IRS is unlikely to bring such a suit. 10 3 Thus, the Internal
Revenue Code's whistleblowing provisions are not likely to address
the problem of favorable action.
B. Judicial Remedies
The final category of recourse against favorable IRS action is a
lawsuit against the IRS that would seek declaratory or injunctive
relief against application of the action. Declaratory or injunctive
relief is advantageous because it sidesteps the thorny issue of retro-
active repeal. If a successful lawsuit blocks application of the IRS
action, then the harmful effects, such as the tax savings resulting
from acquisitions under Notice 2008-83, may never materialize.
99. Professor Zelenak persuasively argues that the IRS can retroactively revoke Notice
2008-83 but concedes that "[t]he issue is not free from doubt." Id. at 893.
100. I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2006).
101. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922
(2006) (codified at I.R.C. § 7623).
102. § 7623(b).
103. The IRS's unwillingness to initiate the necessary litigation could be circumvented
if private individuals could sue on behalf of the government to recover the lost tax revenue.
Currently, suits of this sort are not permitted. However, Professor Ventry proposed an inter-
esting reform that would permit such suits by "using the [False Claims Act] as a model for
the tax whistleblower statute, and extending qui tam to tax." DennisJ. Ventry,Jr., 1histleblow-
ers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 359 (2008).
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Judicial recourse has its own obstacle, however: a plaintiff who
brings suit to challenge a favorable IRS action is likely to have his
case dismissed for lack of standing.
1. Overview of Standing Requirements
A plaintiff must have standing for a "court [to] decide the merits
of the dispute or of particular issues."0 4 The Supreme Court has
articulated a number of requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy to
be granted standing. The first set of requirements derives from Ar-
ticle III of the U.S. Constitution, which restricts federal court
jurisdiction to cases or controversies. 0 5 Since Article III's restric-
tions are constitutional, and therefore applicable in all contexts,
Congress cannot override them by statute. 16 Article III requires
that a plaintiff suffer an injury in fact. 10 7 In addition, the injury
must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, not the con-
duct of a third party.10 8 Finally, a favorable court decision must be
able to redress the injury.1°9
The Court has detailed the injury in fact requirement through
many cases. To satisfy the injury in fact requirement, a plaintiff
must allege a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or
imminent." ° The requisite injury may result from a violation of
constitutional rights, common law rights, or statutory rights."'
Moreover, qualifying injuries may be economic or non-economic,
such as injuries that "reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recrea-
tional'" values.
' 2
The standing requirement related to injury in fact bars "general-
ized grievances."' 13 A plaintiff's claim may be a generalized
104. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
105. U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § 2, cl. 1.
106. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 62 (2d ed.
2002).
107. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
108. Id. This requirement is typically referred to as the causation requirement.
109. Id. at 561. This requirement is typically referred to as the redressability require-
ment.
110. Id. at 560.
111. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 69-73.
112. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (citation
omitted).
113. At one point, the Supreme Court indicated that the bar on generalized grievances
was prudential in nature; however, more recently, the Court has indicated that the require-
ment is constitutional. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (noting that aside
from the "minimum constitutional mandate,"jurisdiction is still not warranted when a plain-
tiff claims a generalized grievance), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74
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grievance if it is "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a
large class of citizens."1 4 Thus, a plaintiff will not have standing if
"their only injury is as a citizen or a taxpayer concerned with hav-
ing the government follow the law.
' '
11
A second set of standing requirements may be overridden by
statute because they are derived, not from Article III, but from the
Supreme Court."6 These requirements are called prudential stand-
ing requirements, because the Court based them on prudent
judicial administration. 7 The first prudential requirement is that a
plaintiff may only sue under her own legal rights and not those of
another person.""
Another prudential requirement, called the zone of interests
test, applies when a person challenges an administrative agency
regulation. The zone of interests test requires that the interest that
the plaintiff seeks to protect must be arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute at issue in the
lawsuit."' To understand the interests Congress sought to protect
in a comprehensive statutory scheme, a court may even consider
the interests protected by statutes beyond the particular statute
under which the plaintiff sued. 20 The zone of interests test "is not
meant to be especially demanding.' 2' To fail the zone of interests
test, the plaintiff's interests must be "so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit.,,122
Aside from prudential requirements, a plaintiff may have stand-
ing if it meets the Article III standing requirements plus either
the requirements of the taxpayer or legislator standing doctrines.
(1992) ("[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance ... does not state an Arti-
cle III case or controversy.").
114. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
115. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 89.
116. Id. at 63.
117. Id.
118. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
119. Id. (stating that the plaintiffs claim must "fall within the zone of interest protected
by the law invoked" in the lawsuit); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) (-[T]he interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.").
120. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 401 (1987) ("As Data Processing demon-
strates, we are not limited to considering the statute under which respondents sued, but may
consider any provision that helps us to understand Congress' overall purposes in the Na-
tional Bank Act.").
121. Id. at 399. "[I]n particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose
to benefit the would-be plaintiff." Id. at 399-400.
122. Id. at 399.
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To sue as a taxpayer, Flast v. Cohen requires the plaintiff to chal-
lenge an expenditure of funds under the Constitution's taxing
and spending clause.1 23 In addition, the taxpayer must show that
the expenditure violates a constitutional provision. 12  Currently,
taxpayer standing only seems permissible pursuant to the Estab-
lishment Clause. 12 5 Members of Congress can achieve standing in
a lawsuit by either claiming individual harm 12 or an institutional
injury.12
7
2. Lack of Standing to Challenge Favorable IRS Actions
Using Notice 2008-83 as an example, this Part will demonstrate
that a plaintiff would be unsuccessful in challenging a favorable
IRS action through litigation due to a lack of standing.
The first step in challenging the legitimacy of a favorable IRS ac-
tion is to identify an appropriate plaintiff and defendant. In the
case of Notice 2008-83, potential plaintiffs might have included a
person (or group of people) suing as a citizen, a person (or group
of people) suing as a taxpayer, members of Congress, competitor
banks that could not take advantage of Notice 2008-83's waiver of
§ 382, or non-banking corporations that were not subject to Notice
2008-83's provisions. The likely defendants in such an action would
have been the IRS or the banks that benefitted from Notice 2008-83.
Once the parties have been identified in a given suit, the plain-
tiff must meet judicial standing requirements. A person suing as a
citizen, a competitor bank, or a non-banking corporation could
have alleged that Notice 2008-83 was inconsistent with existing
123. 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) ("First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between
that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked."); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 106, at 91.
124. FRast, 392 U.S. at 102 ("Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 106, at 92.
125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 93 ("[T]he only situation in which taxpayer
standing appears permissible is if the plaintiff challenges a government expenditure as vio-
lating the establishment clause.").
126. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498-500 (1969) (finding that a legitimate
monetary interest in recovering back pay was sufficient to grant standing to a Congressman
who challenged his exclusion from Congress); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 122-26 (1966)
(finding that an interest in asserting First Amendment rights was sufficient to grant standing
to a newly elected state representative who was excluded from his seat due to his anti-war
rhetoric).
127. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (stating that state senators have an
"interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes" and therefore have standing to
challenge an improper tie-breaking procedure that effectively nullified their votes).
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law1 2s and that it allowed a select group of parties to unfairly save
taxes. Such claims are unlikely to satisfy the injury in fact require-
ment because none of the parties "'personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury.' ,129 The complained-of injuries would more
likely be generalized grievances that were shared by large portions
of the population . 1 3 The non-personal nature of the injuries would
be the same with either the IRS or a beneficiary bank as the defen-
dant. Thus, the failure to assert a valid injury in fact indicates that a
person suing as a citizen, a competitor bank, and a non-banking
corporation is unlikely to have standing.
A bank could have alternatively claimed that the Notice 2008-83
caused it to suffer a competitive injury due to the benefits enjoyed
by one of its competitors. Continuing with the Wells Fargo-Wachovia
example, 31 the plaintiff bank could have been a competitor of Wells
Fargo, which saved taxes under Notice 2008-83, or a competitor of
Wachovia, which became more valuable after issuance of the No-
tice. '3 2 Therefore, the competitive injury suffered might have
qualified as a valid economic injury. Nevertheless, the plaintiff bank
might still have difficulty satisfying the remaining standing require-
ments. Specifically, the benefit enjoyed by the plaintiffs
competitor might have been more properly traced to the IRS's
conduct, rather than that of the competitor bank. 33 Thus, while
the causation requirement would likely have succeeded in a suit
against the IRS, it would likely fail in a suit against a competitor
bank. A suit against the IRS also might have satisfied the redress-
ability requirement, because a favorable court decision granting
declaratory or injunctive relief could have prevented application of
Notice 2008-83, thereby rectifying the competitive injury suffered.
Even if the Article III requirements have been met on the basis
of a competitive injury, however, a court must still apply the zone of
interests test.'34 Applying this test, a suit by a competitor against the
128. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing how Notice 2008-83 was inconsistent with existing
federal law).
129. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979)).
130. SeeWarth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975).
131. See supra Part II.B.
132. The cost to acquire Wachoviajumped approximately $9 billion after the IRS issued
Notice 2008-83. See Regulations Clear Wells Fargo-Wachovia Deal, MSNBC, Oct. 10, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27117020/ [hereinafter Wells Fargo-Wachovia Deal] (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
133. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
134. Inv. Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540,1543-44 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847
(1987) ("Competitive injury alone does not confer standing. Once we find such injury, we
must turn to the 'prudential' or 'zone of interests' standing test...." (citations omitted)).
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IRS would likely fail. The plaintiffs interests in this suit might have
included interests in not allowing any taxpayer to obtain unwar-
ranted tax breaks, not allowing a competitor to obtain a highly
valuable tax break, not allowing government agencies to favor one
industry over another, or not allowing government agencies to fa-
vor certain groups in an industry over other groups in the same
industry. However, none of these interests appear to be what Con-
gress had in mind when enacting § 382, 135 or any other provision of
the Code. 36 Thus, the zone of interests test would likely fail, and
the competitor plaintiff would not have standing to maintain his
suit against the IRS.
A plaintiff who might have sued as a taxpayer, against either the
IRS or a beneficiary of Notice 2008-83, would not likely have stand-
ing because the two-prong Flast v. Cohen test would not be
satisfied.13 7 First, Notice 2008-83 did not involve an expenditure of
funds under the Constitution's taxing and spending clause, as re-
quired by Flast135 Since there was no expenditure, the secondary
requirement that the expenditure violate a constitutional provi-
sion, in particular, the establishment clause,1 3 9 need not be
reached.
Members of Congress who sue to combat favorable IRS action
would likely not have standing on the basis of either individual or
institutional harm. Under Notice 2008-83, for example, a member of
Congress could not have claimed individual harm because nobody
was "singled out for specially unfavorable treatment" and nobody
had been "deprived of something to which they personally are
entitled," such as their seat in Congress.1 40 In addition, a member of
Congress could not claim an institutional injury because Notice
2008-83 did not impact Congress's ability to pass or reject legislation
on the same subject in the future. 41 Thus, members of Congress
would not likely have standing to challenge Notice 2008-83.
135. See KAHN & LEHMAN, supra note 11, at 969 (stating that § 382 aimed to prevent
trafficking in tax attributes).
136. One statute that aims to check agency actions favoring regulated entities is the
Administrative Procedures Act. The zone of interests test derives from the APA's own provi-
sion permitting suit by persons "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). It seems unlikely that the APA itself would qualify as a "rele-
vant statute" because in the Notice 2008-83 context, the plaintiff is aggrieved by the agency
action relating to I.R.C. § 382.
137. 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
138. Id.
139. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 93.
140. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,821 (1997).
141. Id. at824.
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Currently available litigation strategies fall short of either pre-
venting or remedying the harm from favorable IRS actions. The
difficulty in obtaining a federal statute or IRS action overturning
an earlier favorable IRS action makes it unlikely to prevent harm
occurring from the favorable action. In addition, even if a federal
statute or IRS action is obtained, such remedy is likely to be pro-
spective and would not rectify past harm. A suit seeking injunctive
or declaratory relief can prevent realization of harm that occurs
before and after the initiation of a lawsuit. A judicial remedy, how-
ever, has less chance of succeeding than legislation or agency
action because current case law makes it unlikely that any person
would have standing to challenge favorable IRS action. As the law
stands, a suit with the fewest standing obstacles is a suit against the
IRS by competitors of the beneficiaries of favorable IRS action.
IV. SOLUTION: CONGRESS SHOULD PASS A
STATUTE AUTHORIZING STANDING
Congress should pass a statute providing standing for competi-
tors to challenge favorable IRS actions. The harms from favorable
IRS action range from concrete, economic consequences to more
theoretical concerns about the proper role of agencies, Congress,
and political accountability. The seriousness of these harms dem-
onstrates that favorable IRS actions should be challenged. This
Part will review past efforts by Congress to provide standing
through a statute, describe the details of a statutory reform that
will permit standing to challenge favorable IRS action, analyze the
legal validity of such a reform, and evaluate policy issues related to
the statutory reform.
A. Past Attempts by Congress to Create Statutory Standing
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress has the power to
create statutory standing.'4 2 Congress has used this power to confer
standing based on a wide variety of injuries. To better understand
the likelihood that the reform this Note proposes would survive
judicial scrutiny, it is necessary to review some of Congress's at-
tempts to confer statutory standing.
142. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) ("Congress may create a statutory right
or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the
plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute.").
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In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court upheld standing for a group of tenants in an apartment
complex who alleged that the complex's owners discriminated in
the renting of apartments.14 s The plaintiffs sued under the Fair
Housing Act, which permitted suits by "persons aggrieved," defined
broadly as "[a] ny person who claims to have been injured by a dis-
criminatory housing practice."1 44 The Court held that the "alleged
injury to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the
apartment complex [was] the loss of important benefits from in-
terracial associations.',' 45  The Court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs qualified as "persons aggrieved" because doing so was
consistent with "vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be
of the highest priority.'' 46 Absent the statute, the plaintiffs' alleged
injury may not have been sufficient to warrant standing.147 Traffi-
cante illustrates that plaintiffs must suffer an injury to have
standing, but also that standing based on a broadly defined injury
is more likely to be found if a greater policy issue is at stake.
Even after Trafficante, the validity of citizen-suit provisions has
been contested. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs filed a
suit against the Department of the Interior under the citizen-suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) . 4  The ESA
requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize species on the
Interior's endangered species list.149 The Secretary promulgated a
regulation requiring "consultation only for actions taken in the
United States or on the high seas.' '5 0 Plaintiffs sued to restore the
prior regulation, which extended the consultation requirement to
actions taken overseas. 15' The Court rejected standing in this case
because "the injury-in-fact requirement [was not] satisfied by
143. 409 U.S. 205, 206 (1972).
144. Id. at 206 n.1 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 209-10. Specifically, the plaintiffs stated "that (1) they had lost the social
benefits of living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed business and professional
advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of minority groups;
(3) they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social, business, and profes-
sional activities from being 'stigmatized' as residents of a 'white ghetto.'" Id. at 208.
146. Id. at 211 (noting that the statute played an important role in the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 and that the purpose of the law "was to replace the ghettos 'by truly integrated and
balanced living patterns.'") (citations omitted).
147. See id. at 212 (White, J., concurring) (stating that without the statutory grant of
standing in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, he was unlikely to conclude that plaintiffs had
standing).
148. 504 U.S. 555,572 (1992).
149. Id. at 558.
150. Id. at 559.
151. Id.
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congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-
contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe
the procedures required by law."
1 52
Despite Lujan's apparent limitation on citizen-suit provisions,
the Court did not bar citizen-suit provisions entirely. In Bennett v.
Spear, the Bureau of Reclamation was operating a project under
the authority of the Endangered Species Act to protect two species
of fish by limiting water levels in two reservoirs.1 53 Under the ESA's
citizen-suit provision, the plaintiffs claimed the project's restriction
on reservoir water injured them through their reduced use of the
water for "'recreational, aesthetic and commercial purposes, as
well as for their primary sources of irrigation water.' ,,154 The Court
agreed that the adverse impact from the water restrictions was a
satisfactory injury in fact. 5 5 Thus, citizen-suit provisions could be
used successfully if the plaintiffs met the Article III injury in fact
requirement.
In addition to the use of enforcement-based citizen-suit provi-
sions, Congress has established stand-alone, statutory rights as in
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) . FECA allows "ag-
grieved" persons to file a complaint with the Federal Election
Commission if a violation of the statute occurs."57 In Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) de-
cided that a particular group was not a "political committee"
subject to FECA's reporting requirements. 8 Plaintiffs challenged
the FEC's decision on the basis that the group was a political com-
mittee and that the group's failure to disclose information was a
violation of the statute that injured the plaintiffs.'59 The Court
agreed that the plaintiffs' inability to obtain information under
FECA was a valid injury in fact.
60
After Lujan, Bennett, and Akins, it is clear that standing exists if
Congress grants a statutory right and a person suffers a cogniza-
152. Id. at 573.
153. 520 U.S. 154, 159 (1997).
154. Id. at 160.
155. Id. at 168.
156. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2006).
157. 2 U.S.C. § 4 37 g (2006).
158. 524 U.S. 11, 18 (1998).
159. Id. at 16 ("They asked the FEC to find that AIPAC had violated the Act, and,
among other things, to order AIPAC to make public the information that FECA demands of
a 'political committee.'").
160. Id. at 21. The Court noted that in two past cases, an injury in fact occurred "when
the plaintiff fail[ed] to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a
statute." Id. (citing cases involving information disclosure relating to housing availability and
disclosure requirements under Federal Advisory Committee Act).
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ble injury in fact from violation of that right.'6 ' However, not all
Congressional attempts to create statutory rights to justify stand-
ing survive judicial scrutiny. Raines v. Byrd involved a challenge to
the Line Item Veto Act, which permitted the President to "'cancel'
certain spending and tax benefit measures after he has signed
them into law."'6 2 The Act authorized legal relief for those adversely
affected by the Act. 63 Six present and former members of Congress
sued, claiming they were entitled to legal relief because the Act
"adversely affected" them by "dilut[ing] their Article I voting
power.''164 The Supreme Court rejected standing because the plain-
tiffs had not been "deprived of something to which they personally
[were] entitled.' 65 Raines illustrates that to survive judicial scrutiny
the injury in fact must be personal and that the statutory right
should focus on an injury and/or target the plaintiff more nar-
rowly than "any individual adversely affected.'
'
1
6
Judicial scrutiny of Congressional attempts to provide private
individuals with standing provides crucial lessons about how to
successfully craft such a statute. The review of cases above shows
that a plaintiff claiming to have suffered a statutorily defined injury
will still need to satisfy the Article III requirement of injury in fact.1
67
In addition, a statute that defines an injury broadly is more likely to
be upheld if the statute attempts to effectuate an important social
policy.1 s Furthermore, a properly drawn statutory right should pro-
vide an injury that is personal to the individual plaintiff.
6
9
161. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) ("Congress[] ele-
vat[ed] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law."); id. ("Nothing in this contradicts the principle that '[t]he...
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of "statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing." ' " (citation omitted)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
106, at 73 ("So long as the plaintiff meets Article IlI's injury requirement, and infringement
of a statutory right is sufficient in this regard, standing is permitted under a federal statute
permitting citizen suits."); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 153 (5th ed. 2003) (citing Lujan's approval that an
Article III injury may be satisfied by the invasion of a statutory right and also stating that
Akins stands as a "now-settled example" of Congress's ability to create a right).
162. 521 U.S. 811, 814 (1997).
163. Id. at 815.
164. Id. at 817 (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 821.
166. 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1) (2006); see Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (leaving open the possibility
of a suit challenging the Line Item Veto Act "by someone who suffers judicially cognizable
injury as a result of the Act").
167. Seesupra note 161.
168. Compare Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (noting the
statute's role in improving civil rights and social conditions), with Raines, 521 U.S. at 815
(authorizing legal relief for those adversely affected by the Line Item Veto Act).
169. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
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B. Proposed Statutory Reform
A statutory reform to challenge favorable action by the IRS must
appropriately define what favorable means. The term "favorable,"
as used in this Note, is synonymous with "beneficial," which means
that a person receives or is entitled to an advantage. 70 An advan-
tage is a "superiority of position or condition," 7' and the notion of
superiority implies the existence of another person with a lesser
status. Thus, between two people, X and Y, who start at the same
position, an action is favorable if it causes X to be in a relatively
better position than y 72 The range of favorable actions may be
summarized as follows:
TABLE 1-DISADVANTAGES CREATED BY FAVORABLE IRS ACTIONS
# X's Change in Status T's Change in Status Net Result
1 Increase by A No change (or decrease) X's status is greater by A
2 Increase by A + B Increase by A X's status is greater by B
3 No change (or increase) Decrease by A X's status is greater by A
4 Decrease by A Decrease by A + B X's status is greater by B
To satisfy Article III's injury in fact requirement, an attempt to
create statutory standing must focus on the relative injury suffered
by person Y. The injury cannot focus exclusively on the effect on
person Y, however, because in two of the four situations listed in
Table 1 above, Y either feels no impact or benefits in some way
from the IRS action. Thus, the statutory right, the violation of
which would cause an injury in fact, must focus on the net result-
the change in relative position between X and Y-in which Y ends
with a lesser status in all four "favorable" scenarios.
This Note proposes a statutory reform to combat favorable IRS
actions by creating a right to be free from "competitive disadvan-
tage" due to an unlawful IRS action. 7 3 This provision would
provide that any party suffering such "competitive disadvantage"
could sue the IRS for injunctive or declaratory relief. Under the
170. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 114 (11th ed. 2003).
171. Id. at 18.
172. For simplicity, this Note focuses on two people who have the same initial status. Of
course, in practice there are likely numerous permutations of the starting positions of X and
Y. However, discussing the effects of a given action on X and Y's relative starting position
only serves to distract from the main point, which is that a favorable action creates a change
in relative position between two parties.
173. Congress can create a statutory right, the violation of which would create an injury
in fact that forms the basis for standing. See supra note 161.
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statute, competitive disadvantage would be a decrease in competi-
tive position resulting from IRS action that:
1) provides one party with a measurable financial benefit,
provides that party's competitor with either no financial bene-
fit or a less valuable financial benefit, and the benefit is not
created according to a proportional basis," or
2) causes one party to suffer a measurable financial loss or
detriment, causes that party's competitor to suffer either no
loss or detriment, or a lesser loss or detriment, and the loss is
not created according to a proportional basis.
75
Both clauses above use two terms that warrant clarification. First,
the term "measurable" means that a party must be able to estimate
the dollar amount of the benefit or loss and have a reasonable ba-
sis for such estimate.7 6 Requiring that the IRS action have a
measurable impact, and that the plaintiff must have a reasonable
basis for its estimate of the impact, helps weed out frivolous litiga-
tion. To further limit frivolous litigation, the proposed statute
could require that defendants have high gross incomes and/or re-
quire that the IRS action create a sizeable competitive disadvantage
in terms of the tax savings to the defendant.
17
Another phrase requiring clarification is "proportional basis."
The term proportional basis intends to weed out IRS actions that
apply to all entities equally, but may have disparate impacts on two
entities based on the relative proportions of some neutral charac-
teristic of those entities. For example, an IRS regulation that lets
each corporation deduct $1,000 of ordinary income for each em-
ployee would permit Company X, which has ten employees, to
deduct more than Company Y, which has five employees. However,
such a regulation should not be considered favorable because the
deduction is simply proportional to a characteristic of Company
X's business.
174. This clause encapsulates the first two scenarios in Table 1.
175. This clause encapsulates the last two scenarios in Table 1.
176. Since the estimated dollar impact is likely based on the tax benefits of the favor-
able IRS action, a reasonable basis for the estimated impact of the IRS action could be
ascertained by researching a potential defendant's financial statements or other publicly
available information.
177. The IRS already uses monetary thresholds in some enforcement situations. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 7623(b) (5) (2006) (limiting applicability of the tax whistleblowing statute to those
taxpayers with gross income over $200,000 in a given year and a tax liability of $2 million or
more).
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
Additionally, the statute would not be applicable if the defen-
dant had already completed a transaction valued at $100 million or
more in substantial reliance on the favorable IRS action. This pro-
vision aims to prevent criticism of suits under the proposed statute
that, if successful, could have retroactive effect. Retroactive reme-
dies are generally undesirable because they may discourage
taxpayers' reliance on valid IRS guidance."' If the proposed statute
had been in effect when Notice 2008-83 was issued, that Notice
would have illustrated the problem of reliance. On September 29,
2008, Wachovia agreed to be purchased by Citigroup; on Septem-
ber 30, 2008, the IRS issued Notice 2008-83;79 on October 3, 2008,
Wells Fargo outbid Citigroup for Wachovia; s° and Wells Fargo's
acquisition of Wachovia closed on December 31, 2008. l8 l From the
timeline, it is clear that Wells Fargo relied on Notice 2008-83 in
making its $11 billion bid for Wachovia. If Citigroup or another
competitor sued prior to the deal's closing,112 Wells Fargo could
claim that Notice 2008-83 should not be invalidated because they
would suffer an $11 billion penalty for substantially relying on the
notice. However, Wells Fargo's reliance claim would have little
weight because the deal had not yet closed, Wells Fargo would not
yet have received the tax benefits from Notice 2008-83, and Wells
Fargo would have the option of cancelling the deal with the only
penalty being the administrative costs of planning the merger, not
the full $11 billion that the acquisition would have cost.
On the other hand, if Citigroup or a competitor attempted to
sue after December 31, 2008, Wells Fargo would have already spent
$11 billion on the acquisition and would have realized the tax
benefits from Notice 2008-83. If a court then invalidated Notice
2008-83, Wells Fargo's loss of its tax benefits would be fundamen-
tally unfair because it had spent large amounts of money in
reliance on Notice 2008-83. Thus, the "reliance threshold" aims to
prevent suits where a party substantially relied on an IRS action.
Although it is also unfair to invalidate tax benefits stemming from
a $500 transaction, this Note employs a $100 million reliance
threshold because if a defendant claims substantial reliance on the
178. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1261 (a) (4), 123 Star. 115,343; Zelenak, supra note 88, at 890.
179. Paley, supra note 10, at Al.
180. David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, Wachovia Chooses Wells Fargo, Spurns Citi, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
181. Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo and Wachovia Merger Completed (Jan. 1,
2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), availabe at
https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101 Wachovia-Merger.
182. This scenario assumes that any suit filed prior to the deal's closing would seek a
preliminary injunction to prevent the deal from closing pending resolution of the case.
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IRS action to evade suit under the proposed statute, a high thresh-
old value gives weight to the substantial reliance claim. Of course,
this Note would advocate the adoption of a higher or lower reli-
ance threshold if that value better indicated reliance.
Whatever the threshold amount, the proposed statute's use of a
threshold invites criticism. The criticism may arise because one of
the purposes of stopping favorable IRS action was to prevent eco-
nomic harm from such actions and the reliance threshold allows
some parties to get away with those economic benefits. This criti-
cism is well-placed; effective enforcement of the tax laws, however,
requires balancing policy concerns, such as reliance, with a strict
desire to eliminate all economic harm from violation of the tax
laws.18 3 A large enough reliance interest, stemming from a tangible,
completed transaction that cannot be undone with minimal cost,
may warrant limiting lawsuits. Of course, the reliance interest does
not completely trump enforcement concerns, as a lawsuit could
still be initiated prior to completion of the tangible transaction.
The statute would also encompass a number of smaller provi-
sions. First, the statute should contain a severability provision, such
that if a court holds invalid either the competitive disadvantage
clause or the lost tax revenue clause, the remaining provision still
has legal authority. Second, suits under the proposed statute
should be confined to initiation in a particular court or circuit. 
4
The benefit of this tactic is that duplicative suits brought under the
competitive disadvantage provision or the lost tax revenue provi-
sion will be easier to detect and consolidate if they are brought in
the same forum. In addition, having all cases in one court or cir-
cuit prevents problems stemming from consolidating separate suits
that are brought in venues far away from each other.
183. The IRS is quite familiar with balancing policy concerns and enforcement. See, e.g.,
Ventry, supra note 103, at 385 ("[T]he Service has said it wants the Whistleblower Office to
concentrate on large-dollar cases.").
184. The specific court or circuit is not integral to the proposed reform, however, it is
important to note that Congress has utilized such a tactic for other subjects. See, e.g., 38
U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006) (granting the Court of Veterans Appeals "exclusive jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals."); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (2006) (grant-
ing exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia over matters
concerning the Clean Air Act); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
§ 1005, 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to hear claims regarding enemy combatants).
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C. The Proposed Statute Withstands Judicial Scrutiny
The proposed statute is likely to withstand judicial scrutiny be-
cause it shares features with existing statutes and is consistent with
case law upholding standing based on other federal statutes' stand-
ing provisions.
1. Features are Consistent with Past Precedent
The proposed statute is likely to be upheld because it shares a
common goal with numerous federal statutes-the protection of
competition. In some contexts, such as antitrust, unfair trade prac-
tices, and banking, Congress has explicitly allowed suits by
competitors to protect them from injury.85 Where Congress has
not been explicit, courts have held that statutes can protect certain
groups from harmful effects on competition stemming from an
agency action.'8 Congress's frequent attempts to protect competi-
tion, combined with judicial validation of those attempts, suggest
that the proposed statute is likely to be upheld.
The proposed statute is also likely to withstand judicial scrutiny
because courts are familiar with the three substantive inquiries that
must be undertaken when hearing a suit under the proposed stat-
ute. First, the substance of the statute involves the legitimacy of an
underlying government action,'87 and such an inquiry is one with
which most courts are likely familiar. The second inquiry deter-
mines whether a defendant substantially relied on the IRS action in
undertaking a transaction valued at $100 million or more. A fac-
tual inquiry based on reliance should be familiar to courts because
reliance is a basic principal of contract law'88 Finally, courts must
185. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (2006) (allowing "[any person injured in his business"
to sue those who violate the Agricultural Fair Practices Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1850 (2006) (per-
mitting suit by competitors of subsidiaries that may be acquired under the Bank Holding
Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (permitting suit by competitors of those who violate
antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 298(b) (2006) (permitting suit by "[any competitor, customer,
or competitor of a customer" against those who violate the Jewelers Liability Act).
186. See, e.g., Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 US. 479,
488 (1998) (the Federal Credit Union Act); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403
(1987) (the National Bank Act); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621 (1971) (the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157
(1970) (the Bank Service Corporation Act).
187. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994) (requiring assessment of whether the defen-
dant's action violated the comprehensive provisions of the Clean Water Act); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 16-18 (1998) (the plaintiffs sued because the FEC's decision
that a group was not a "political committee," and therefore not subject to reporting re-
quirements under the FECA, violated the plaintiffs right to information).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 & cmts. a, b (1981).
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assess the appropriateness of injunctive or declaratory relief under
the proposed statute. Again, courts are likely familiar with the ap-
plication of equitable relief standards. Thus, a court's familiarity
with both the merits and relief inquiries under the proposed stat-
ute suggest that the statute will withstand judicial scrutiny.
2. Standing is Likely to Be Upheld
The proposed statute's utility comes from its ability to provide a
plaintiff with standing to challenge a favorable IRS action. This
Part will demonstrate that a suit brought under the competitive
disadvantage provision satisfies Article III and prudential standing
requirements: injury in fact, causation, redressability, and zone of
interests.
The competitive disadvantage injury proposed by this Note will
satisfy Article III's injury in fact requirement because courts have
frequently recognized similar competitive injuries as valid. In par-
ticular, increased competition resulting from agency action that is
inconsistent with a statute can be a valid injury in fact.'89 The in-
creased competition need not materialize; a sufficient injury in fact
may be one resulting from an agency action that clearly threatens
to competitively injure a plaintiff.l9° Competitive injuries, while
most applicable to this Note for their frequent use in challenging
agency actions, have also been recognized outside the administra-
tive agency context. For example, courts have recognized that
competitive injuries, such as a lesser opportunity to compete, sat-
isfy the injury in fact requirement when challenging violations of
the Equal Protection clause. 19' Thus, a competitive injury suffered
189. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971) (recognizing that increased
competition to a plaintiff from an agency regulation can be a valid injury in fact); Ass'n of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (emphasizing that the injury
in fact test is satisfied when a plaintiff "allege[s] that competition ... might entail some
future loss of profits"); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (noting
that Congress may confer standing on a person that is "financially injured by the issue of a
license" under the Communications Act).
190. See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting
that an injury in fact occurs when agency action authorizes "transactions that have the clear
and immediate potential to compete with the [plaintiffs] own sales" so the plaintiff "need
not wait for specific ... transactions to hurt them competitively"); Inv. Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815
F.2d 1540, 1543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987) ("The FDIC will deal petitioners
competitive injury by allowing insured nonmember banks to enter the securities field indi-
recty through subsidiaries and affiliates.").
191. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (noting that a city ordinance preferring minorities in the contract
bidding process created an injury in fact because of the plaintiffs "inability to compete on
an equal footing"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978)
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under this Note's proposed statute is likely to satisfy the injury in
fact requirement ofjudicial standing.
The causation and redressability requirements are also likely to
be satisfied under the proposed competitive disadvantage provi-
sion. Causation will be met because, by definition, the competitive
injury is caused by the IRS action.9 2 Injunctive or declaratory relief
is also likely to redress some or all of the competitive disadvantages
suffered, depending on the situation prior to the favorable IRS ac-
tion, the nature of the favorable IRS action, and the competitive
injury that results.
To better show how equitable relief can redress competitive inju-
ries, this Note will evaluate injuries resulting from Notice 2008-83.
Prior to Notice 2008-83, Citigroup planned to acquire Wachovia for
$2.1 billion, but after the IRS issued Notice 2008-83, Wells Fargo
swooped in and acquired Wachovia for $11.7 billion.193 Thus, Notice
2008-83 created three types of competitive disadvantage injuries.
First, a competitor of Wachovia would have been disadvantaged by
Wachovia's $9 billion increase in value because the future tax
savings realized by a bank that acquired Wachovia under Notice
2008-83 made Wachovia a more attractive merger partner.
194 Citi-
group suffered a disadvantage from its loss of the specific benefits
it would have gained had it completed the Wachovia acquisition as
intended in the absence of Notice 2008-83. Finally, Wells Fargo's
competitors, especially Citigroup, were disadvantaged by Wells
Fargo's acquisition of the future benefits from Wachovia's business.
The short-term competitive advantage gained by Wells Fargo,
and the corresponding short-term disadvantage to its competitors,
turned out to be quite significant; the merger became final on
December 31, 2008 and Wells Fargo reported a $3 billion profit in
the first quarter of 2009, largely attributable to the Wachovia acqui-
sition.9 5 The long-term disadvantage from the tax savings under
Notice 2008-83 might be as high as $19.4 billion dollars. 96 Thus, if
(noting that a medical school's decision to reserve sixteen places for minorities caused an
injury in fact to a medical school applicant because he was not able to compete for all one
hundred places in the class).
192. See supra Part N.B.
193. Wells Fargo-Wachovia Dea supra note 132.
194. Id. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the artificial competitive advantage result-
ing from Notice 2008-83. See also supra Table 1, scenario 1.
195. See Matthias Rieker & Damian Paletta, Banks Get Boost From Wells Fargo, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 10, 2009, at C3. But seeJonathan Weil, Wells Fargo's Profit Looks Too Good to Be True,
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=
a6svOhG.nW7g (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (attributing
much of the gain to accounting gimmicks).
196. Drucker, supra note 8, at A3.
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any of the competitors sued for injunctive or declaratory relief un-
der the competitive disadvantage provision prior to the finalization
of the Wells Fargo-Wachovia merger, a favorable court decision
overruling or blocking Notice 2008-83's tax benefits would likely
redress the competitor's disadvantage.19 7 If a competitor sued after
the merger completed, injunctive or declaratory relief might also
redress competitive disadvantages relative to the merged entity. 9"
These examples illustrate that a suit under the competitive disad-
vantage provision is likely to satisfy the redressability requirement.
Finally, the proposed statute is likely to satisfy the zone of inter-
ests test.""9 A plaintiff's interest in suing under the proposed statute
is rooted in an interest in stopping the competitive disadvantage
resulting from IRS actions. The proposed statute likewise aims to
prevent the creation of competitive disadvantages from IRS ac-
tions. The zone of interests test is satisfied because the plaintiffs
interest in suing is among the interests Congress would seek to
protect.200 Furthermore, courts have held that "competitors of fi-
nancial institutions have standing to challenge agency action
relaxing statutory restrictions on the activities of those institu-
tions."2 ' This holding is directly applicable to competitors who,
under the proposed competitive disadvantage clause, would chal-
lenge favorable actions by the IRS-actions which can take the
form of relaxed tax laws.02 Therefore, the zone of interests test is
likely to be met, and, combined with satisfaction of the Article III
requirements, a court is likely to uphold standing under the pro-
posed statute's competitive disadvantage clause.
197. A court could say that overruling Notice 2008-83 would not guarantee that Wacho-
via would return to its pre-Notice 2008-83 value. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 45-46 (1976) ("[T]he complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory
in this suit would result in respondents' receiving the hospital treatment they desire.").
However, the fact that Wachovia's $9 billion increase in value occurred within a couple days
of Notice 2008-83's issuance suggests that in the absence of Notice 2008-83, the market value
would return to its pre-Notice 2008-83 value.
198. Judicial relief under the proposed statute is subject to a "reliance threshold." See
supra Part IV.B.
199. Congress can negate the zone of interest test by using broader language to author-
ize suits than it normally uses. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997). However,
language restricting suits to "competitors" is not likely to negate prudential standing. Id. at
165. Thus, the issue is not applicable to this Note's analysis of standing.
200. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621 (1971) (finding that when Congress "legis-
late [s] against the competition that the [plaintiffs] challenge," the plaintiffs have standing).
201. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488
(1998); see also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987); Inv. Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at
621; Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (per curiam).
202. Notice 2008-83's waiver of § 382 of the Internal Revenue Code could be consid-
ered a "relaxing" of the tax laws.
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
D. Policy Considerations
This Note proposes a reform that provides competitors with
standing to challenge favorable IRS actions, and the previous Part
demonstrates that courts are likely to grant standing to a party that
sues under the proposed statute. The analysis is not complete,
however, without considering policy implications of the proposed
reform, such as whether a judicial remedy is an appropriate
method of resolving the problem, whether the reform will flood
the courts with litigation, and whether permitting private individu-
als to sue is a good idea.
One criticism of the proposed reform is that using the political
process might be preferable to relying on a judicial remedy to ad-
IRS. 203dress favorable IRS action. This argument relies on the notion
that standing is "built on ... the idea of separation of powers,
'
,
4
which in turn gives courts pause when deciding whether an action
taken by the executive or legislative branches is unconstitutional.2 5
Separation of powers also teaches that vindication of the public
interest is the responsibility of the political branches of govern-
ment,0 6 and therefore, standing may not be appropriate when a
large class of citizens share the same harm.0 7 These concerns, while
legitimate in theory, are not applicable to the problem of favorable
IRS action. First, courts frequently decide the legality of agency
208actions and a federal statute clearly provides for such evaluations.
Second, simply because a large number of people have been
harmed by an action does not mean that they should not have
20standing. 09 In particular, a concrete harm that is widely shared
"does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its
vindication in the federal courts.",2 0 Thus, a judicial remedy is
permissible to combat favorable IRS action.
Even if ajudicial remedy is permissible, it may be criticized as fa-
cilitating a flood of frivolous or abusive lawsuits, designed to hurt a
competitor or enemy. This argument has many problems. First,
203. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) ("[W]here large numbers
of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide
the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.").
204. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
205. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997).
206. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
207. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
208. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
209. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 687 (1973) ("[Sltanding is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the
same injury.").
210. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998).
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standing is designed to weed out frivolous lawsuits211 and this Note
proposes suits only by a group of competitors, not the general
population. In addition, the proposed statute limits suits by requir-
ing that a party have reasonable basis for their estimation of the
competitive benefit or disadvantage incurred from a favorable IRS
action.12 Furthermore, the statute could be modified to resemble
the tax whistleblowing statute,13 which uses monetary thresholds to
deter frivolous suits. 214 Even if a party has standing, all suits brought
under the proposed statute must be filed in the same jurisdiction,
meaning duplicative suits can be eliminated or consolidated.2 1 Fi-
nally, high litigation costs always provide a deterrent against
abusive litigation. Consequently, abusive litigation is not likely to
be a significant problem.
Another criticism of the proposed judicial remedy is that the
problem of favorable IRS action does not necessarily warrant reli-
ance on individual citizens acting as private attorneys general. In
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Court granted
standing to plaintiffs who sued as private attorneys general under a
federal statute.2 6 The Court permitted standing because suits by
private persons were the "primary method of obtaining compliance
with the [Civil Rights] Act."21 7 In addition, Congress considered
compliance with Civil Rights Act "to be of the highest priority" be-
cause it protected the quality of citizens' daily lives.1 s
Addressing discrimination in the civil rights era is far different
from addressing the consequences of favorable IRS actions. How-
ever, the differing natures of the problems do not require different
tactics to solve them, especially since the justifications for using
private individuals to combat discrimination are also applicable to
combating favorable IRS actions. For instance, suits by private indi-
viduals are likely the only effective remedy against favorable IRS
actions, given that legislative and executive solutions are difficult to
obtain or inadequate. 9 In addition, the recent backlash against
211. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 61 ("[S]tanding is said to serve judicial efficiency
by preventing a flood of lawsuits by those who have only an ideological stake in the out-
come.").
212. See supra Part lV.B.
213. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5) (2006) (permitting suit only when monetary thresholds have
been exceeded).
214. See Ventry, supra note 103, at 385 (noting that the whistleblowing statute's "dollar
limitations shrink considerably the potential universe of [frivolous] actions").
215. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the exclusive jurisdiction requirement).
216. 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
217. Id. at 209.
218. Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
219. See supra Part III.A.
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bailed out banks using government funds to pay bonuses suggests
that preserving tax revenues rightfully owed to the government is a
high priority.220 While not the same as racial integration, tax reve-
nues play an important role in the daily lives of a nation's citizens
through social welfare programs and other government services. In
summary, the justifications for using private attorneys general in
the civil rights context are also present in the context of combating
favorable IRS actions. Therefore, the proposed statute's reliance
on suits by private individuals is acceptable.
V. CONCLUSION
Favorable IRS actions that are contrary to federal law are a seri-
ous problem because the IRS may not have legal authority to take
such actions and such actions can have a significant economic im-
pact. In addition, favorable IRS actions of this sort are inconsistent
with the role of an administrative agency, lack accountability, and
essentially bypass this country's system of checks and balances. Due
to the lack of available remedies that can effectively counteract the
effects of favorable IRS actions, this Note proposes a new statute to
permit judicial challenges of favorable IRS actions. By focusing on
the injuries created by favorable IRS actions, the proposed statu-
tory reform provides standing to the competitors of those whom
the IRS action favors. In enacting the proposed statute, Congress
will help limit the effects of future IRS action that directly conflicts
with federal law.
220. See, e.g., Jane Sasseen & Theo Francis, As AIG Bonus Fury Grows, Lawmakers Target
Pay & Geithner Explains, BUsINEssWEEK, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/
blogs/money-politics/archives/2009/03/congress.propos.html (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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